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by their complete lack of regard for 
tradition and worthless theories.”
American wars along the Great War-
path, Cohen reminds us, were parts 
of European wars. The Atlantic Ocean 
more linked us to Europe than it 
insulated us from it. Moreover, these 
wars exposed us to a full range of 
seventeenth-to-nineteenth-century 
European warfare, from set-piece 
battles to what could be called un-
conventional and secret warfare. They 
also brought the full horror of war to 
us. Cohen explodes the contemporary 
European notion that the United States 
did not become “the territory of war” 
or exposed to terror until 2001. Indeed, 
terror in the form of murderous raids 
on New York and New England villages 
marked much of its colonial period.
Among many other things, Cohen argues 
that the American appetite for the kind 
of unconditional surrender pursued by 
Franklin Roosevelt in World War II had 
its grounding in the eighteenth-century 
American intention to destroy the en-
emy polity that was Canada. More than 
that, America’s wars to attach Canada 
to itself were wars for the freedom of 
that polity. Cohen says, “If any countries 
have ever been ‘conquered into liberty,’ 
as the Continental Congress had written 
to the doubtful habitants of Canada 
in 1775, they were Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, occupied and transformed by 
armies that combined, in paradoxical 
degree, thoroughness in defeating an 
enemy and an unlimited, even naïve, 
commitment to liberating him.”
Cohen’s book is an astonishingly 
good read in addition to being highly 
thoughtful and often revelatory. 
KEN JENSEN
McLean, Virginia
Matzke, Rebecca Berens. Deterrence through 
Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy 
under Pax Britannica. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska 
Press, 2011. 320pp. $45
Historians have long argued about the 
true mechanism behind a ninety-year 
period of relative peace in Europe, a 
period that began with the end of the 
Napoleonic wars and became known 
as the Pax Britannica. Over the years 
critics have questioned both aspects 
of this term—whether the period was 
actually as peaceful as its title suggests 
and whether that peace really was, 
in large part, due to Great Britain’s 
overwhelming and imposing com-
mercial, industrial, financial, and naval 
might. Through a searching analysis of 
political decision making during three 
different crises within an eight-year 
period, Rebecca Matzke’s book, itself a 
developed and published version of the 
author’s Cornell University dissertation, 
seeks to add weight to the notion that 
Britain did indeed use the strength and 
versatility of the Royal Navy as an effec-
tive deterrent force during this time. 
The author explains that on three sepa-
rate occasions between 1838 and 1846 
(Canadian trade and border disputes 
with the United States, 1838–42; the 
Syrian crisis, 1840–41; and the first 
Opium War of 1839–42), British politi-
cians, in particular Lord Palmerston, 
were not afraid to threaten the use of, or 
to use, naval power to further discrete 
British interests on the world stage and 
to coerce and influence the activities 
of their main rivals in Europe. In each 
case, while the immediate aim was 
obviously to benefit British regional 
activities, each was undertaken with 
an eye to preserving the broader peace 
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and stability of the international order 
as a whole. In other words, Britain’s 
defensive “status quo” policy was 
implemented by operationally offensive 
threats or means. Furthermore, Matzke 
clearly shows that the British politicians 
well understood that if they failed to 
respond to some of these lesser chal-
lenges (the Chinese opium war being a 
prime example), over time they risked 
weakening their ability to influence their 
major adversaries in the future, in situa-
tions where the stakes might be higher. 
During the course of her analysis, 
Matzke takes issue with established 
scholarship holding that the relative 
inactivity of the Royal Navy during this 
period was indicative of its compara-
tive weakness within Europe as a whole. 
On the contrary, she depicts an early 
Victorian navy that was well up to the 
task, possessing shipbuilding, logis-
tics, and manpower support superior 
to that of any competitor. It was this 
depth of capability that represented 
its major coercive value, particularly 
to the European rivals, often allow-
ing what she terms demonstrations of 
Thomas Schelling’s “skillful nonuse of 
military force.” Moreover, the British 
instinctively knew all this, giving them 
great confidence in their brinkmanship 
with rivals. The case of the successful 
coercion of France in the Egyptian/
Syrian crisis is a notable example.
Matzke’s work is meticulously re-
searched, using a wide array of contem-
porary archival material that focuses 
on the collected thoughts and writings 
of the main players involved, mate-
rial taken from their personal papers, 
letters, and diaries. The weakness in 
her work lies in the admittedly implicit 
assumption that this short period can 
be taken as truly illustrative of the 
situation throughout the whole of 
the Pax Britannica. Arguably, Matzke 
has found a narrow historical period 
where thesis and facts align, but she is 
less convincing over the broader time 
frame, and more work would likely be 
necessary to settle this point decisively. 
Less important, but nonetheless still 
of concern, is her rather rosy picture 
of the reliability of the steamships of 
the day. As John Beeler has forcefully 
demonstrated, truly globally deploy-
able, oceangoing steamers would have to 
wait until the late 1880s to be realized; 
their limitations until then, in terms of 
maintenance requirements and support 
while deployed, facts of which navies 
were only too well aware, do not come 
across well. That said, this is an impor-
tant work that successfully advances 
the study of British naval policy into 
an earlier period. When taken together 
with the more established scholarship 
of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
periods, it moves us closer to a more 
complete understanding of British 
efforts to wield naval power in sup-
port of a global free-trading system. 
As such, it has timeless relevance. 
ANGUS K. ROSS
Naval War College
Kleinen, John, and Manon Osseweijer, eds. Pi-
rates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives. Singapore and Lei-
den: ISEAS Press and International Institute for 
Asian Studies, 2010. 312pp. $74
Liss, Carolin. Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy 
and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and 
Bangladesh. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS Press 
and International Institute for Asian Studies, 
2011. 446pp. $82.35
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